Fake content represents an important portion of those files shared in BitTorrent. In this paper we conduct a large scale measurement study in order to analyse the fake content publishing phenomenon in the BitTorrent Ecosystem. Our results reveal that a few tens of users are responsible for 90% of the fake content. Furthermore, more than 99% of the analysed fake files are linked to either malware or scam websites. This creates a serious thread for the BitTorrent ecosystem. To address this issue, we present a new detection tool named FakeDetector that may prevent the download of almost 10 millions of fake files per year based on our evaluation. This could help to reduce the number of computer infections and scams suffered by BitTorrent users.
INTRODUCTION
In a previous work [4] we demonstrated that the BitTorrent ecosystem is suffering a continuous poisoning attack. We found that a significant part of all the torrents uploaded in The Pirate Bay site (the most popular BitTorrent portal) are fake content. In particular, the users injecting those contents, named Fake Publishers, contribute 30% of the overall torrents that produce 25% of the download events. These results highlight a serious issue that, to the best of the authors knowledge, has not been still covered by the research community.
In this paper, we thoroughly analyse the fake publishing phenomenon in BitTorrent in order to understand its real impact on the system performance as well as the potential risks of fake content for BitTorrent users. We base our study on data collected from torrents published in The Pirate Bay portal during a period of 14 days from 30-04-2011 to 13-05-2011.
In order to fight the described phenomenon, the first step is to properly characterise the fake publishers and their behaviour. The current BitTorrent portals solutions identify fake publishers through the user account that they use to upload fake torrents to the portal. We show in the paper that this technique is inefficient since the fake publisher can generate as many user accounts as needed in those portals. Instead, the parameter that uniquely identifies the fake publisher is the IP address it uses to perform its activity. Surprisingly, our data reveals that that just 20 fake publishers (whose IP we identify) are responsible for injecting 90% of the fake content in the BitTorrent ecosystem. Moreover, most of these IP addresses belong to Hosting Providers where the fake publishers rent dedicated high-resource servers to perform their activity.
Therefore, the fake publishing activity is time consuming since a fake publisher needs to manually create the user accounts used in the different portals (in some cases up to 4 accounts per day). Furthermore, this activity requires dedicated resources (e.g. rented servers). This investment in time and resources can be only justified by a strong motivation behind the distribution of fake content. We have downloaded and manually inspected a large number of fake content published during our measurement period and found 3 different profiles among the fake publishers: (i) a first group of fake publishers aims to spread malware using the popular BitTorrent system; (ii) a second set of users tries to attract BitTorrent users to scam websites in order to get economical benefit from the victims by using different scam techniques; (iii) the last group is formed by antipiracy agencies that upload fake versions of those content that they want to protect.
Our data shows that more than 99% of the published fake content is associated with the two first profiles. This supposes a very serious thread for the BitTorrent ecosystems since the activity of these publishers may lead to thousands of undesirable episodes of scammed users and computer infections. These findings suggest that new solutions need to be proposed in order to eliminate or at least reduce the number of fake con-tent available in the BitTorrent ecosystem. Towards this end, we have designed and implemented FakeDetector. This is a novel detection tool that allows to identify the IP address of the fake publisher, thus being able to report as fake each content published from this IP address at the moment of its publication. Based on the performed evaluation, FakeDetector would be able to avoid almost 10 millions fake content downloads every year. This means, preventing thousands of users to suffer from computer infections or scam incidents every year. FakeDetector can be currently used through a publicly available website and a Vuze plugin.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we describe our measurement methodology and present our dataset. Next, Section 3 characterises fake publishers, while Section 4 classifies them depending on the goal they pursuit with their activity. In Section 5 we describe and evaluate our solution to improve the detection of fake content. Section 6 describes relevant works to this paper. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
MEASUREMENT METHODOLOGY
This section describes our measurement methodology to identify and characterise the main properties of the fake publishers (i.e. users publishing fake content). For this purpose we crawl The Pirate Bay, the most popular BitTorrent portal as reported by previous works [11] and by Alexa Ranking [1] . However, previously to detail our methodology we briefly describe the way of publishing content on The Pirate Bay (and by extension on other BitTorrent portals) and how fake publishers do it.
Background
When a user wants to make available a content through the BitTorrent protocol, it creates a .torrent file including relevant information such as: (i) the content infohash, a unique identifier of the content in the BitTorrent ecosystem; (ii) the IP address of the BitTorrent Tracker managing the content distribution process. More specifically, the Tracker knows the IP address and download progress of each peer in the swarm; (iii) the size of the content and the number of pieces forming the file. After creating the .torrent file, the publisher uploads it to one or more BitTorrent portals. In the case of The Pirate Bay, a publisher needs to create a user account in order to be able to upload .torrent files to the portal.
When a user wishes to download a content, it first downloads the .torrent file associated to the content from a BitTorrent portal such as The Pirate Bay. Then, the user retrieves the IP address of the Tracker managing the swarm from the .torrent file and connects to it. The Tracker provides the user with a list (50 to 200) of IP addresses participating in the swarm along with the number of seeders (peers with a complete copy of the file) and leechers (peers with an incomplete copy of the file) forming the swarm. Finally, the user starts downloading the content from the obtained IP addresses.
More relevant to our paper, a content publisher can be identified by the IP address of the initial seeder (i.e. the original source of the content) and by the username utilised to upload the .torrent file to The Pirate Bay (or other BitTorrent portal). Moreover, The Pirate Bay offers three services that are relevant to our measurement study: (i) an RSS feed system in which each new published content is announced along with the username that uploaded the .torrent file to the portal; (ii) each user registered within The Pirate Bay portal has an individual webpage in which its published torrents are listed and (iii) The Pirate Bay removes the accounts, webpages and .torrent files of those users whose content is detected as fake. Typically, this happens after a user, who downloaded the content, reports its falseness to The Pirate Bay administrators.
Finally, we can define a fake publisher as a user that exploits the BitTorrent ecosystem to publish fake content, this is, content that is different than what is expected from the content name. A fake publisher makes available the fake content from a single IP address that corresponds to the initial seeder of all its published content. Furthermore, in the case of The Pirate Bay, the fake publisher creates a user account from which it uploads .torrent files associated with fake content until The Pirate Bay removes this account (after some user's report). Then, the fake publisher reacts by creating a new account to publish new .torrent files and this loop keeps repeating. To the best knowledge of the authors, the technique based on users' reports is the only one used nowadays for detecting and deleting fake content.
Measurement Methodology
The main objective of our measurement study is to identify fake publishers. Towards this end, our measurement tool has two independent modules. The first one is responsible for finding the IP address and username of the publisher associated with each announced content in The Pirate Bay. For this purpose, the module is subscribed to the RSS feed of The Pirate Bay in order to learn each torrent just after its birth. After getting a new .torrent file the tool obtains the username that uploaded the .torrent file to The Pirate Bay and also connects to the associated Tracker to obtain the IP addresses of the peers forming the swarm in its very initial stage. Then, it is very likely that we can find the IP address of the content publisher (initial seeder). Specifically, we face three different situations: (i) The tracker only reports the IP address of the initial seeder. This is likely to happen since we connect to the swarms just after the torrent birth. Then, by connecting to all these peers and obtaining their bitfields (vector that shows the number of pieces that a peer possesses) we are able to identify which one is the initial seeder, and thus the content publisher. (iii) In some cases, the Tracker announces the presence of quite a few seeders in the swarm thus we cannot identify the initial seeder. This happens because the swarm has been formed before the torrent is announced in the RSS feed of The Pirate Bay portal. Therefore, using the described methodology we are able to characterise the content publisher by both its username and IP address in many cases.
The second module of our tool is responsible for identifying those publishers that are in fact fake ones. For this purpose our tool connects periodically (every 5 minutes) to the webpage of each known publisher. If at some point the webpage has been removed we consider that the IP address associated with the removed account belongs to a fake publisher. Furthermore, we also collect the time that The Pirate Bay requires to detect and eliminate each fake publisher account.
Finally, our tool has a third module that counts the number of peers that connect to the swarm of each fake content in order to download it. Specifically, our tool systematically queries the Tracker managing the download of each fake content to obtain those IP addresses participating in the swarm. In order to accelerate this process we perform this task from four independent machines.
Dataset
We have applied the described methodology between 30-04-2011 and 13-05-2011, in addition to 5 days of warm-up phase dedicated to identify the initial fake publishers' IP addresses. During the measurement period we have collected 27543 torrents, from which 10073 (37%) were identified as fake ones. Furthermore, we have collected the IP addresses of those peer participating in swarms associated with fake content until the moment the content is removed from The Pirate Bay. 
FAKE PUBLISHERS CHARACTERIZA-TION
As stated in the introduction, BitTorrent is under a systematic poisoning attack. Therefore, it is critical to eliminate or at least reduce the number of fake content in BitTorrent ecosystem. The first step towards this end is identifying who is responsible for publishing this fake content and characterising their behaviour. In this Section, we address this issue using the collected data. More specifically, we aim to answer questions such as: How many fake publishers (i.e. IP addresses) are uploading fake content to the BitTorrent Ecosystem?, From where (i.e. which ISP) they perform their activity? or How frequently they upload fake content?.
Number and Contribution of Fake Publishers.
Unexpectedly, we observe that only 71 IP addresses are responsible for those 4883 fake content for which we identified the initial seeder. This implies almost 70 fake content published from each of these IPs in average. However, it is interesting to investigate the level of the contribution of each one of these fake publishers. Towards this end, Figure 1 depicts the percentage of fake content published by the top x% of these fake publishers. The graph shows a skewed distribution where 10 IPs (14%) are responsible for publishing almost 75% of all the fake contents. Moreover, this number increases to 90% if we consider the top 20 IP addresses. Therefore, we can conclude that a reduced number of just 20 fake publishers are responsible for poisoning the BitTorrent ecosystem. In the rest of the paper we focus on thoroughly studying this group of 20 fake publishers that we refer to as Top Fake Publishers.
Location of fake publishers.
We have mapped the IP address of each one of the Top Fake Publishers to its correspondent ISP using the MaxMind database [9] . Surprisingly, 17 out of the Top 20 fake publishers are operating from Hosting Providers. These are companies dedicated to rent high-resources (cpu, memory and bandwidth) provisioned servers. Moreover, 70% of the fake content is seeded from just two Hosting Providers named OVH Systems and Obtrix located at France and New Zealand respectively.
Fake publishers need on the one side resources in order to sustain the distribution of a large number of fake files [4] and on the other side anonymity due to the illegitimate activity being performed. The usage of rented servers in Hosting Providers covers both requirements.
Finally, the use of dedicated servers in Hosting Providers reveals that most of the fake publishers perform their activity from a stable IP since those servers typically have a static IP address configured.
Pirate Bay accounts utilisation.
The Pirate Bay solicits to solve a CAPTCHA [3] in order to create an account to avoid the automatic generation of accounts. Hence, fake publishers are obeyed to create their accounts manually. Figure 2 shows the CDF of the number of The Pirate Bay accounts used by each one of the 71 identified fake publisher. A fake publisher use (in median) 6 accounts in a period of 14 days. However, a 5% of the fake publishers injects content using more than 58 different accounts in the same period. This represents an average number of 4 accounts per day. This result suggests that fake publishers need to dedicate time to track the availability of their accounts in order to manually generate new ones if needed.
Publishing Strategies.
Fake users follow two different strategies to upload fake contents into The Pirate Bay portal. On the one hand, we found users that publish a large number of fake content in a row (typically around 10) in just few seconds after creating a user account. Once the account is deleted, they repeat the same process from a new account. Around 70% of Top Publishers use this technique. On the other hand, 30% of the Top Publishers upload just one or two fake contents with a username. This technique initially attracts less downloaders, but extends the time that those fake accounts are active before being eliminated when compared to the previous case. Specifically, those fake publishers using the first strategy have their accounts detected within 92 minutes in average whereas those using the second strategy are deleted within 253 minutes, this is their contents are available 2.75 more time in The Pirate Bay.
Strategies to attract downloaders.
The main goal of fake publishers in BitTorrent is to produce as many downloads of their content as possible. Therefore, they need to offer torrents that sound very attractive for the downloaders. Towards this end, we have observed that fake publishers use three different strategies: (i) they assign to the content a very popular name such as the title of the last released Hollywood movies; (ii) creating the false impression that the content has been published by a well-known and trusted user. For this purpose, the fake publisher names its content in the same way as the trusted one. For instance, eztv one of the most popular publisher in The Pirate Bay adds the signature [eztv] at the end of the title of its published files. Then, some fake publishers also add this signature to the title of their fake content; (iii) presenting attractive performance statistics (i.e. a high number of seeders and leechers) for the fake torrent. Hence, the fake torrent is perceived as a very popular torrent by the downloaders, that assume they will obtain a high download rate in case of selecting that torrent. In order to generate these fake statistics the publisher connects to the Tracker many times using a single IP but different ports. Then the tracker considers each one of these IP+port pairs as a single peer and reports a high number of seeders and leechers. The Pirate Bay retrieves and presents these statistics from the Tracker.
In summary, the fake content publishing activity is performed from Hosting Providers facilities by just few dozens of users. Furthermore, fake publishers are aware of how the BitTorrent ecosystem works, thus they use sophisticated strategies in order to improve the success of their activity.
FAKE PUBLISHERS PROFILES
After characterising the Fake Publishers behaviour, we still need to answer an important question: What incentives a user has to publish fake content?. To answer this question we have downloaded several files published by each of the fake publishers in our dataset and manually inspected them. Our analysis reveals the presence of three different profiles: malware propagators, scammers and antipiracy agencies.
Malware propagators.
These users exploit the popularity of BitTorrent system in order to rapidly propagate malware among thousands of users. On the one hand, for some of the users in this group the downloaded content is the malware itself. In this case, the content including the malware pretends to be typically a patch for a popular game, a key generator, etc. On the other hand, a second set of users use a more sophisticated technique. They publish a movie with a catchy title. The content has the standard size of a DivX movie (i.e. between 700MB and 1GB), and even sometimes includes a second small file with a real sample of the movie. Hence, the file has the appearance of a non-fake legitimate content. However, when a user downloads the content and tries to play the movie, it is requested to reproduce it using Windows Media Player (WMP) in case a different player is run instead. When the movie is finally reproduced with the WMP a pop-up window appears requesting to install new codecs along with an url link from where these codecs can be downloaded. Of course, the file includ-ing those pretended codecs is reported as a malware by security and anti-virus software.
Scammers.
In this case, the fake publisher uses a similar technique to the sophisticated one described above. However, when the user plays the movie with WMP, it is automatically redirected to a website in the Internet. A second variant used by scammers is to provide a .rar file protected with a password, and offer the user a website in which the password can be obtained. Once the user gets into one of these websites, a credit card payment is requested in order to obtain some privilege to watch the downloaded movie (e.g. the password of the .rar file). In some other situations the user is informed that in order to check it is not a bot, a survey must be filled previously to watch the movie. This survey results to be a contest in which you are obeyed to subscribe to a paid premium SMS service. These websites are often reported as scam on different forums, one example of them is http://topcatchmovies.com.
In short, the final goal of these scammers is to get money from the users wishing to watch the film.
Antipiracy Agencies.
The two previous profiles have dishonest purposes. Antipiracy agencies instead, publish fake version of the copyrighted content that they want to protect. The action performed by antipiracy agencies is limited in the number of contents (under request from a company) and time (in the weeks before and after the content, e.g. movie, is released).
In summary, we distinguish three different profiles among fake publishers that motivates them to perform their activity. On the one hand, 65% of the Top Publishers in our dataset are malware propagators and are responsible for around a 30% of the published fake content. On the other hand, a 35% of the Top Publishers are scammers and they published a 70% of the fake content during our measurement period. Finally, antipiracy agencies represent a very small fraction of the fake content published.
Finally, it is worth to mention that the content published by malware propagators and scammers is potentially harmful, specially for not technically skilled downloaders. Hence, they represent a serious risk for the BitTorrent ecosystem that should be erased or at least mitigated. We address this issue in the next Section.
FAKE DETECTOR
In the previous Sections we have demonstrated that a large number of fake content (37%) is currently being published in the BitTorrent ecosystem, and what is worse, most of these fake contents are potentially harmful for those users that download them. We have also seen that the techniques used to remove these contents are inefficient and requires human intervention to: first, detect and report the falseness of a given content, and second, remove it from the BitTorrent portals (this is done by the portal administrator). Furthermore, the scope of the user reports is limited to a single BitTorrent Portal, thus the content is removed exclusively from this portal instead of the whole BitTorrent ecosystem.
In this Section we present our tool, named FakeDetector, that aims to automatise and accelerate the process of detecting fake publishers. For this purpose, FakeDetector identifies a fake publisher by its IP address instead of its username as it is done by BitTorrent portals such The Pirate Bay nowadays. By doing so, a fake content can be identified just after its birth since we can identify that the IP address of the initial seeder belongs to a fake publisher.
Furthermore, contrary to current techniques used by BitTorrent portals, FakeDetector removes the fake content from the whole BitTorrent ecosystem because it reports the content infohash. Since the infohash uniquely identifies a content in the BitTorrent, a user of FakeDetector can identify the content as fake independently of the portal from which the content was retrieved (or even if it comes from the BitTorrent DHT service).
In the rest of the Section we present the details of the FakeDetector implementation as well as the performance results.
FakeDetector Implementation
FakeDetector uses The Pirate Bay portal in order to identify new fake users and the IP addresses from where they operate. Towards this end, it continuously monitors the RSS feed of The Pirate Bay portal. For each new published torrent FakeDetector gathers the following information: publisher's username, the infohash associated with the content and the IP address of the initial seeder (if it is possible). In parallel, FakeDetector periodically connects to the webpage of the different discovered publishers within The Pirate Bay. Then, if at some point a publisher's account is removed from The Pirate Bay, we mark that user and all its torrents as fake. In addition, we annotate this publisher's IP address as potential fake publisher. If three different accounts associated with a given publisher's IP address are removed from The Pirate Bay, we consider this publisher a fake publisher. From this moment on, any content published from that IP address is identified just after its birth and reported as fake. Therefore, in the worst case, i.e. for new fake publishers, FakeDetector employs the same time than The Pirate Bay to identify fake contents. However, once the fake publisher IP address has been detected, FakeDetector is able to report fake content immediately after its publication.
Furthermore, FakeDetector maintains a blacklist including the torrent infohashes associated with all the FakeDetector is available for BitTorrent users through two different interfaces. On the one hand, we have built a web-based application where a BitTorrent user can upload a .torrent file it wants to validate 1 . The application retrieves the torrent infohash and checks if it corresponds to any of the fake content identified by the FakeDetector. On the other hand, we have implemented a Vuze plugin that sends to the FakeDetector the torrent infohash of each downloaded .torrent file. If a torrent is identified as fake, the plugin shows an alarm to the user.
FakeDetector Performance
We have evaluated the performance of FakeDetector and compared it with the fake content detection mechanism used by The Pirate Bay during a testing period of 14 days. First, we count how many fake content published in The Pirate Bay are identified by the FakeDetector just after its birth. Furthermore, we measure how long The Pirate Bay takes to identify these fake content. The obtained results show that FakeDetector is able to early detect 50% of the fake content uploaded to The Pirate Bay. Moreover, Figure 3 represents the cdf of the time difference between the detection instant of FakeDetector and The Pirate Bay for these content. We observe, that FakeDetector reduces the detection time 60 minutes in median. However, this reduction is higher than 2 hours for 20% of the fake contents, and for some cases it goes up to several days.
Although previous results already demonstrate the significant improvement provided by our tool compared to the state of the art solution, the final objective of FakeDetector is reducing the number of download events 1 This application is available at http://fakedetector.netcom.it.uc3m.es/Fake_torrent/ associated with fake content, thus preventing BitTorrent users facing malware and scam. Then, if FakeDetector was widely used, it would have prevented more than 370K fake content downloads just during the 14 days of the evaluation period compared to The Pirate Bay. By extending this value to a complete year, we can state that FakeDetector would be able to eliminate almost 10 millions of fake content downloads per year. This means, depending on the success of the fake publishers strategies, preventing up to tens of thousands of malware infections and scam incidents per year.
RELATED WORK
Several authors have used real data collection in order to understand different aspects of BitTorrent [6, 5, 7] . However, only few works have looked at the content publishers [11, 2] and just our previous work [4] mentions the presence of the fake publishers that we thoroughly analyse in this paper. Furthermore, we have seen that most of the published fake content is associated with illegitimate activities such as malware propagation. Few previous works have studied the malware propagation through P2P systems [12, 8, 10] . Specifically, Kalafut et al. [8] analyse LimeWire whereas Shin et al. [10] analysed KaZaa. These authors look at the problem from the content perspective instead of the fake publisher perspective used in this paper. This avoids that they discover more sophisticated strategies as those reported in our study in which the content itself is not the malware but includes a link to the malware. Finally, the authors of [8] propose to filter those content with a specific size since most of the malware content has specifically this size. Unfortunately, this solution is not valid for BitTorrent. Instead, we propose a more sophisticated solution (FakeDetector) that provides early detection of fake content.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper presents the first comprehensive study about fake content in the BitTorrent ecosystem. For this purpose we use real data collected during a largescale measurement study. The obtained results demonstrate that just a few tens of users are responsible for most of the published fake content. Furthermore, more than 99% of the fake torrents are associated with either malware or scam websites. This represents a serious thread for the BitTorrent ecosystem that must be eliminated or at least mitigated. Towards this end, we have implemented FakeDetector, a novel tool for early detection of fake content. Based on our initial evaluation the widely usage of this tool may prevent the download of millions of fake content every year, thus contributing to reduce the number of computer infections and scam episodes faced by BitTorrent users.
